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Abstract 
The existence of climate change remains an unjustifiably vexed issue worldwide. In New 
Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric 
Research Ltd, sceptics’ attempts to challenge NIWA’s temperature records allowed the 
Court to extend its reach into the heart of the scientific research process. Whilst this paper 
supports Venning J’s determination that NIWA’s decisions were within the Court’s 
jurisdiction for review, his finding that individuals might suffer harm as a result of them is 
shown to be unjustified. Furthermore, the Court’s inherent unsuitability to addressing 
matters with high scientific contents, due to its adversarial nature and judges’ lack of 
scientific training, supports a finding of non- or partial justiciability. Non-justiciability is 
here rejected for allowing scientists behaving fraudulently to escape rebuke. The standard 
of deference Venning J attempts to introduce is similarly flawed as it allows unwary judges 
to unintentionally judge matters of science. Concerns are also raised that research might 
stagnate if scientists must worry about judicial scrutiny of their work. Thus, a standard of 
flagrant impropriety, or “fraud, corruption or bad faith”, is argued to be the ideal 
threshold for permitting judicial review of scientific research.  
Key Words: judicial review, scientific research, NIWA, justiciability, deference 
I Introduction  
In 2012, scientists nationwide celebrated Venning J’s decision in New Zealand Climate 
Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd 
(NIWA’s case).1 The case was brought by climate change sceptics questioning the 
methodology used by the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA) 
to compile data indicating that New Zealand’s temperature had risen over the last century. 
The New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust (the Trust) sought judicial review of 
NIWA’s decision to publish the data; however, having dismissed much of the Trust’s 
evidence, the judge found in NIWA’s favour. This result, scientists believed, demonstrated 
judicial willingness to uphold scientific research processes, forcing “those wanting to 
challenge widely-agreed scientific findings to do so honestly and openly in scientific 
forums”.2 They were wrong. In reality, the High Court had ensured its own ability to 
                                                   
1
New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust v National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd 
[2012] 1 NZLR 75 [NIWA’s case]. 
2James Renwick “Leading Climate Scientists Welcome Judge’s Decision” (press release, 7 September 2012). 
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review research compiled by Crown Research Institutes (CRIs).
3
 A requirement that courts 
be “cautious” when interfering with specialist bodies’ findings is all that now prevents 
judges from intervening in scientific research.4 
In this paper, I argue that this is insufficient. Instead, CRIs’ decisions should be reviewed 
only in cases of “fraud, corruption or bad faith.”5 In Part III, I agree with Venning J that 
NIWA’s decisions were public and thus within jurisdiction for judicial review. Despite 
exaggerating the decisions’ impacts on individuals and the lack of alternative relief, the 
judge does not deserve criticism for considering NIWA’s institutional characteristics. 
However, the unsuitability of court processes to addressing matters of science, as 
demonstrated in Part IV, cannot be ignored. Problems surrounding the adversarial system, 
inexpert judges and often-partisan expert witnesses make the Court ill-equipped to resolve 
scientific issues. In Part V, I examine two possible responses: non-justiciability and partial 
justiciability, otherwise known as deference. Non-justiciability is rejected for allowing 
scientists behaving fraudulently to escape scrutiny. However, Venning J’s formulation of 
deference is insufficient to protect the research process’s integrity. I instead advocate for 
review only in cases of flagrant impropriety. 
II Out of the Lab and into Litigation: NIWA’s case 
In 2012, the New Zealand Climate Science Education Trust (the Trust) sought judicial 
review of the National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA). NIWA is a 
Crown Research Institute (CRI) dedicated to environmental science, including 
atmospheric, climatic and marine disciplines.6 At issue were temperature records, collated 
by NIWA, indicating that New Zealand had warmed over the past century. The Trust’s 
first complaint concerned NIWA’s decision to publish the 7SS temperature series, which 
revealed 0.9ºC warming between 1909 and 2009.7 The 7SS (seven-station series) takes 
data from seven locations nationwide, merging it to give a national average of the annual 
mean surface temperature.8 However, the raw data must be adjusted to account for regions’ 
                                                   
3 The Crown Research Institutes are AgResearch, Institute of Environmental Science Research, Institute of 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences, Landcare Research, NIWA, Plant and Food Research and Scion. Ministry 
of Business, Innovation & Employment “Crown research institutes” (1 February 2013) <www.msi.govt.nz>. 
4 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [41]. 
5 Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994] 2 NZLR 385 at 392. 
6 NIWA “Our Science” <www.niwa.co.nz>. 
7 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [4]. 
8 The sites used are Auckland, Masterton, Wellington, Hokitika, Nelson, Lincoln and Dunedin. See NIWA 
“Seven-station series temperature data”<www.niwa.co.nz>. 
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differing climates as well as site-specific factors such as shelter from trees and movement 
of weather stations.9 The Trust objected to NIWA’s method of adjustment, similarly 
criticising the eleven-station series (11SS) which corroborated the 7SS, and the review 
NIWA conducted after the Trust’s initial complaint.
10
 
A Availability and Standard of Judicial Review 
The initial issue was whether judicial review was available. Venning J determined that it 
was, having considered NIWA’s statutory origin, its obligation to undertake research 
benefitting New Zealand, and the retention of its shares by responsible ministers.11 The 
judge also reasoned that as NIWA’s research may influence government policy, its actions 
may affect citizens’ rights.
12
 Furthermore, unlike cases involving State-owned Enterprises 
(SOEs), plaintiffs could not seek private law remedies if judicial review were denied.13 
Thus, Venning J concluded that judicial review was available as NIWA’s functions are 
public, not commercial.14 
In contemplating the appropriate standard of review, Venning J held that courts should be 
“cautious” when examining the work of specialists “acting within their own sphere of 
expertise”.15 Thus, “less intensive review” is appropriate where the Court feels unable to 
decide between scientific opinions.16 The Trust therefore needed to demonstrate that the 
decision-making process was defective or “clearly wrong in principle or in law” before the 
Court would intervene.17 
B The 7SS 
Having dismissed much of the Trust’s evidence as non-expert opinion, the judge rejected 
all complaints about the 7SS.18 These included that NIWA failed to consider “recognised 
scientific opinion”, using methods to account for movement of monitoring sites described 
in a 1990 thesis, rather than the 1993 paper the Trust endorsed.
19
 This, the Trust claimed, 
                                                   
9 Ibid.  
10 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [11]. 
11 At [20], [21] and [26]. See also Crown Research Institutes Act 1992, s 5. 
12 At [27]. 
13 At [34]. 
14 At [32-33]. 
15 At [36] and [41]. 
16 At [44]. 
17 At [48]. 
18 At [49-54] and [116]. 
19 At [56]. 
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breached NIWA’s obligation to “pursue excellence”, which the judge found to be 
enforceable,20 as well as constituting a failure to consider mandatory considerations, 
unreasonableness and a mistake of fact.21 
Venning J is clear that, while he does not wish to interfere with scientific debates, the 
Court will determine factual disputes.22 Thus, he would not resolve the parties’ conflict 
over whether the 1993 paper contained the definitive methodology for such calculations.23 
This was in any case rendered irrelevant by the Court’s determination that NIWA had 
effectively used the 1993 paper’s approach.24 The judge further found that NIWA met its 
obligation to consider “accepted scientific practices and opinions”.25 An argument that 
NIWA made a mistake of fact by not appreciating that the warming trend observed was 
due to the movement of weather stations to warmer sites was also dismissed as NIWA’s 
contrary explanation was “credible and understandable”.26 
C The 11SS and the review 
Similar claims regarding the 11SS were dismissed.27 The judge found NIWA’s evidence 
that it had neither deliberately chosen sites supporting a warming trend nor ignored gaps in 
the record “credible and reasonable”.28 However, he reiterated that the Court would not 
resolve matters involving “different contestable scientific opinions”.29 
The Trust’s final target was NIWA’s review, which used a different methodology to 
demonstrate the 7SS’s validity.30 It argued that NIWA ignored recognised scientific 
opinion, utilising the same grounds of review as for the 7SS.31 In rejecting them, the judge 
concluded that whether a particular methodology was open to NIWA, and was not 
unprecedented and unpublished, was a matter of scientific debate and not for the Court to 
resolve.32 Venning J also accepted that recalculating temperatures using different methods 
                                                   
20 At [66] and [77]. 
21 At [106], [116] and [114]. 
22 See for example at [78] and [115]. 
23 At [79-82]. 
24 At [83] and [104]. 
25 At [105]. 
26 At [113]. 
27 At [138-139]. 
28 At [120]. 
29 At [137]. 
30 At [180-184]. 
31 At [145].  
32 At [151]. 
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but generating the same results strengthened the claim that the 7SS was robust.
33
 
Arguments that NIWA should not have compared particular sites and that data was used 
from sites sheltered by trees or buildings or impacted by urban heat island effects 
(resulting from cities being warmer than surrounding countryside as buildings and concrete 
retain additional heat) were dismissed as issues of science.34 
Thus, the Trust’s arguments were rejected entirely. However, that they were even 
considered sets a precedent which should concern all associated with CRIs. Whilst the 
following parts support Venning J’s determination that NIWA’s decisions were within the 
Court’s jurisdiction for judicial review, they also examine why his attempts at deference 
had the opposite effect and why review of scientific research should be severely restricted. 
III Problems of ‘publicness’: why NIWA’s decisions were within the 
Court’s jurisdiction. 
In this part, I contend that whilst Venning J was right to conclude that the Court had 
jurisdiction to judicially review NIWA’s decision, his reasoning contains unfounded 
assumptions. Whilst the terminology remains controversial,35 jurisdiction here refers to 
one of two facets of amenability to review.36 The second, justiciability, is addressed in 
Parts IV and V.
37
 Jurisdiction requires that decisions be public in nature before judicial 
review is permitted. It is essentially a “value judgment” as to whether public law principles 
should apply.38 Jurisdiction and justiciability overlap significantly. Whilst impacts on 
individuals’ rights and the existence of alternative remedies may relate to justiciability, 
they are here included under jurisdiction as Venning J considers them whilst discussing 
publicness.39 Thus, this part demonstrates that the judge was mistaken in finding that 
NIWA’s decisions affected individuals’ rights and that alternative remedies were not 
                                                   
33 At [157]. 
34 At [173]. 
35 See for example, Chris Finn “The Justiciability of Administrative Decisions: A Redundant Concept?” 30 
FLR 240 at 262-263 and B V Harris “Judicial Review, Justiciability and the Prerogative of Mercy” (2003) 63 
CLJ 631 at 632-633. 
36 Chris Finn “The concept of ‘justiciability’ in administrative law” in Matthew Groves and H P Lee, 
Australian Administrative Law: Fundamentals, principles and doctrines (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) 143 at 144-147 and Jenny Cassie and Dean Knight “The Scope of Judicial Review: Who 
and what may be reviewed” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Administrative Law Conference, 
August 2008) 63 at 63-64. 
37 Finn “The concept of justiciability”, above n 36, at 144-147. 
38 Peter Cane Administrative Law (5th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 16. 
39 They are similarly treated in R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc [1987] 1 All ER 
564. 
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available. However, Venning J’s overall conclusion that NIWA was amenable to review is 
correct. Criticism of his institutional approach is unfounded. 
A Have individuals’ rights been affected? 
A key element of ‘publicness’ and thus jurisdiction is whether a decision affects private 
individuals’ rights. I contend that NIWA’s decisions did not.40 Venning J determined that 
NIWA’s research “may be used in developing Government policy” and thus may 
“adversely affect…rights and liabilities”.
41
 However, it would then be the Government’s 
decision to act upon that research in a particular way, not NIWA’s publishing it, which 
caused harm. NIWA does not even suggest what action, if any, the government should 
take. Harm resulting from NIWA’s decision is “hypothetical [in] character” as the 
Government may not (and probably will not) act upon NIWA’s findings.42 Furthermore, 
decisions would be taken in the wider scientific context. If the Government opted to 
combat climate change, it would do so based on an array of national and international 
scientific opinion, not because of a single temperature series. 
Furthermore, Venning J’s approach assumes that policy-makers are ignorant of the 
uncertainties associated with science, which may lead to one paper producing aberrant 
results. In reality, significant public policy literature exists on the part scientific 
uncertainties play in “wicked” (highly complex) problems.
43
 Further, while no statistics 
exist on public servants’ scientific literacy, it is noteworthy that four ministries regularly 
encountering scientific challenges have at least one science graduate on their leadership 
teams, two at PhD level, in addition to various scientific advisors.
44
 Thus, policy-makers 
should know not to base important decisions on single pieces of questionable scientific 
                                                   
40 Reckitt and Coleman (New Zealand) Ltd v Pharmaceutical Management Agency Ltd [1997] NZAR 464 at 
474, and Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 3. For an example of a decision to publish affecting rights, see 
Royal Australasian College of Surgeons v Phipps [1998] 3 NZLR 1 at 10. 
41 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [27]. 
42 Peters v Davison [1999] 2 NZLR 164 at 188. 
43 Jake Chapman, Charlie Edwards and Simon Hampson Connecting the Dots (Demos, London, 2009), 
Matthijs Hisschemöller and Rob Hoppe “Coping with Intractable Controversies: The Case for Problem 
Structuring in Policy Design and Analysis” (1996) 8 Knowledge and Policy 40 and Connie P Ozawa 
“Science and Intractable Conflict” (2006) 24 Conflict Resolution Quarterly 197. 
44 These being the Ministries of Health, Environment, Primary Industries and Business, Innovation and 
Employment. See Ministry of Health “Executive Leadership Team” (21 September 2012) 
<www.health.govt.nz>; Ministry for the Environment “Leadership Team” (25 January 2013) 
<www.mfe.govt.nz>; Ministry for Primary Industries “Senior Leadership Team” (25 July 2013) 
<www.mpi.govt.nz>; and Ministry for Business, Innovation and Employment “Senior leadership” (30 
January 2013) <www.mbie.govt.nz>. 
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evidence. Should they do so, judicial review of the resultant policy decision to force a 
wider look at the available information would be appropriate. 
Harm to individuals’ reputations might also prompt review.45 Even mere opinion may be 
sufficiently damaging, if accompanied by “real practical consequences”.
46
 However, 
NIWA’s decision to publish seems unlikely to harm even highly-polluting industries’ 
reputations. First, the 7SS and its associated reports merely illustrate a warming trend; 
there is no reference to climate change, the greenhouse effect or carbon dioxide and thus 
no implied criticism of organisations potentially contributing to climate change.47 Second, 
attributing any harm to reputations to this particular report would be difficult. It would 
more likely result from the huge volume of scientific evidence of anthropogenic climate 
change worldwide. Even where a more direct connection between the research and 
businesses’ activities exists, it remains arguable that reasonable members of the public 
understand that a single piece of research is not conclusive. Events such as “Glaciergate”, 
where the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change mistakenly reported that all 
Himalayan glaciers would disappear 300 years too early, have shown that reputable 
institutions can make mistakes.48 This of course does not mean we should abandon all 
control of the scientific process to judges lacking scientific training. 
B Will individuals be left without redress? 
If individuals are to be harmed by a decision, courts will be reluctant to deprive them of 
redress; however, where other remedies are available, relief may be denied.49 Venning J 
expresses anxiety that, as private law actions against NIWA are unavailable, denying 
judicial review would leave plaintiffs without recourse to the courts.50 This concern is 
unfounded. Policy decisions made using NIWA’s research remain reviewable. 
Furthermore, the policy stage is when individuals are affected and to postpone review until 
then is more consistent with international authority. Parties may also utilise non-legal 
methods. 
                                                   
45 Peters v Davison, above n 42, at 166. 
46 At 182 and 188. 
47 Global warming is mentioned but in reference to the findings of a particular article and not in reference to 
the temperature data at issue. NIWA Report on the Review of NIWA’s ‘Seven-Station’ Temperature Series 
NIWA Information Series No. 78 (NIWA, Wellington, 2010). 
48 Malcolm Downden “Has climate change litigation become more difficult? [2010] 160 NLJ 171 at 171. 
49 Waitakere City Council v Waitemata Electricity Shareholders Society Inc [1996] 2 NZLR 735 at 747; 
Mercury Energy, above n 5, at 391 and McGechan on Procedure (Brookers, Wellington, 1995-) para JA4.03. 
50 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [34]. 
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1 Legal remedies 
As discussed above, Venning J finds that harm may be caused by government decisions 
made using NIWA’s research.51 It is therefore contended that it is more appropriate to seek 
remedies at the policy stage. Alternatively, in the language of “ripeness for review”, a 
concept prevalent in US literature, no “real and... imminent” problems exist until the 
Government acts; only then is judicial intervention appropriate.52  
Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organizations v The Department of 
the Environment and Belize Electric Company Ltd offers a prominent example of review 
occurring at the policy stage rather than once research is published.53 The Privy Council 
was primarily occupied with deficiencies in scientific reports on the planned location for a 
dam. These included glaring errors in the geological survey, which mistook sandstone for 
granite.54 However, it was the government’s decision to build the dam that was under 
review; there were no separate proceedings reviewing the research. 
The European Community Courts also review scientific research only at the regulatory 
stage.
55
 Expert bodies’ scientific opinions are considered merely non-binding preparatory 
measures.56 They may thus be reviewed only indirectly once regulations based upon them 
are implemented. Furthermore, these opinions recommend courses of action and may not 
involve primary research, making them closer to policy decisions than the pure scientific 
research NIWA undertakes, yet they are not reviewable.57 However, clear illegality 
relating to these opinions generates a presumption that unlawfulness taints any consequent 
regulatory decisions.
58
 European courts will also only scrutinise procedural matters, not the 
underlying scientific evidence.59 
                                                   
51 At [27]. 
52 Kenneth Culp Davis “Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review” (1955) 68 Harv L Rev 1122 
at 1122. 
53 Belize Alliance of Conservation Non-Governmental Organizations v The Department of the Environment 
and Belize Electric Company Ltd [2003] UKPC 47. 
54 At [38-48]. 
55 See for example Case T-326/99 Nany Fern Olivieri v Commission and European Agency for the 
Evaluation of Medicinal Products [2003] ECR II-06053. 
56 Oliver Hartmann “The (Dis) Entanglement of Law and Science: Judicial Review of Science-Based 
Measures by EC Courts” (LLM Dissertation, University of Maastricht, 2008) at 10. 
57 At 8. 
58 At 13 and 38. 
59 Joined Cases T-75/00, T-76/00, T-83/00, T-84/00, T-85/00, T132/00, T-137/00, T-141/00 
Artegodan GmbH e.a. v Commission [2002] ECR 4945 at [197]. 
11                            Can’t See the Science for the Solicitors: Judicial Review of Scientific Research in Light of NIWA’s case 
By contrast, in the United States, “agency science” is reviewed, albeit with great 
deference.60 However, agency science differs significantly from NIWA’s “pure research 
science”.61 Its purpose is to fulfil legal obligations to allow implementation of policy 
decisions, leaving it open to abuse as government and interest groups heavily influence 
outcomes, timetables and funding.62 Former agency employees report that lawyers and 
policymakers deliberately manipulate and distort research outcomes.63 Thus, apparently 
scientific decisions are actually a science-policy hybrid.
64
 In contrast, CRIs, although 
Crown entities, are not in thrall to the Government, instead producing research for New 
Zealand’s benefit, rather than for the ruling party.65 
As the resulting policy decision may be reviewed, I contend that comprehensive judicial 
review of NIWA’s decisions is unnecessary. Plaintiffs should not be allowed to challenge 
scientific research through both decisions to publish and the eventual policy decision. This 
would not only waste court time and resources, it undermines the finality of the Court’s 
ruling. Arguably, it is more efficient to address problems with research before policy 
decisions are taken to avoid the same issue arising regarding multiple regulations. 
However, this presupposes any policy decision will be made based upon that research 
alone.  
2 Non-legal remedies 
Plaintiffs might also pursue non-legal options, such as publishing papers rebutting 
NIWA’s research in well-respected journals. The principal control on scientific research 
comes after publication, when other scientists may scrutinise results and publish dissenting 
papers. While peer review attempts to ensure only quality research is published, it is not 
infallible.66 Less robust findings might not appear in major journals, but still be accepted 
by lesser known publications.
67
 Some peer reviewers may also favour particular 
                                                   
60 Sara A Clark “Taking a Hard Look at Agency Science: Can the Courts Ever Succeed?” (2009) 36 Ecology 
LQ 317 at 326. 
61 Emily Hammond Meazell “Super Deference, the Science Obsession and Judicial Review as Translation of 
Agency Science” (2009) 109 Michigan Law Review 733 at 735 and 743. 
62 At 743 and 747. 
63 E Donald Elliott, Alan Charles Raul, Richard J Pierce Jr, Thomas O McGarity & Wendy E Wagner 
“Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?” (2001) 31 ELR 10125 at 10127. 
64 Hammond Meazell “Super Deference”, above n 61, at 744-745. 
65 Crown Research Institutes Act, s 5. 
66 Patrick A Fuller “How Peer Review of Agency Science Can Help Rulemaking: Enhancing Judicial 
Deference at the Frontiers of Knowledge” (2007) 75 Geo Wash L Rev 931 at 956-957. 
67 Holly Doremus “The Purposes, Effects and Future of the Endangered Species Act’s Best Available 
Science Mandate” (2004) 34 Envtl L 397 at 411. 
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methodologies or results.
68
 Thus, papers will only gain reputability if other scientists 
support their conclusions and can repeat their results.69 If NIWA’s results cannot withstand 
such scrutiny, the scientific community will quickly abandon them. This may take time, 
but as demonstrated above, organisations are unlikely to suffer harm in the interim. Even 
the Trust’s own expert witness acknowledged that publishing a dissenting paper is the 
correct approach.70 This is more likely to advance the Trust’s cause than court action as 
most people understand that judges are not scientists. The ability to resolve issues through 
non-legal methods has previously contributed to courts refusing judicial review, and 
arguably should have influenced Venning J.71 
C Has a public decision-making power been exercised? 
Determining whether NIWA has exercised a public decision-making power is problematic 
as, while the above suggests that its decisions had no “real practical” public consequences, 
NIWA is undoubtedly a public body.72 Cases examining a decision’s ‘publicness’ may be 
categorised as institutional, which examine whether the responsible institution is a public 
body, or functional, which focus on the decision itself.
73
 Venning J employs the former 
approach, highlighting NIWA’s establishment under the CRI Act, which dictates that 
research “be undertaken for the benefit of New Zealand”.74 Further, he notes its public 
funding and accountability to a responsible minister.
75
 
Ferrere criticises Venning J’s institutional approach, arguing that the focus should have 
been on the nature of the decision.76 Indeed, since R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, 
ex parte Datafin (Datafin), New Zealand has seen a trend towards an increasingly 
functional approach.77 Private institutions exercising public powers are now reviewable, 
whilst statutory recognition does not guarantee that all an organisation’s functions will be 
scrutinised.
78
 However, there is a fundamental difference between individual researchers 
                                                   
68 Fuller, above n 66, at 957. 
69 Doremus, above n 67, at 411. 
70 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [81]. 
71 Cowl v Plymouth City Council [2002] 1 W.L.R. 803 at [25]. 
72 Peters v Davison, above n 42, at 188. 
73 Cassie and Knight, above n 36, at 66. 
74 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [21] and [33]. 
75 At [26]. 
76 Marcelo Rodriguez Ferrere “Judicial review of scientific findings” [2012] NZLJ 380 at 381. 
77 Datafin, above n 39, at 569. 
78 Finnigan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc (No 2) [1985] 2 NZLR 181 at 186 and Auckland 
Electric Power Board v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand CA 45/93, 8 September 1993 at 15. 
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making false claims and publicly-funded CRIs doing so. Prominent later cases have 
acknowledged this, with courts adopting a combined institutional/functional, or 
contextually functional, approach.79 Even the Court in Datafin does not completely ignore 
institutional factors.
80
 Thus, Venning J was right to consider NIWA’s position as a public 
institution. 
Here, a contextually functional approach would acknowledge the improbability of NIWA’s 
decisions having “important public consequences”.
81
 Furthermore, since anyone can 
publish virtually anything in today’s technological world, it is difficult to consider 
publishing a public function.82 However, courts have reviewed decisions to publish reports 
based on inaccurate content.
83
 More importantly, NIWA’s position as a CRI and use of 
public funds demand the application of the more stringent public law norms if they are 
being abused. Venning J was thus justified in determining that NIWA’s decisions were 
public and within the Court’s jurisdiction for judicial review. 
D Summary 
Ultimately, there is no right answer as to whether NIWA’s decisions are public or not as 
‘publicness’ is not “like redness – a characteristic that can simply be observed.”84 The lack 
of harm to individuals and availability of other remedies do not conclusively exclude the 
Court’s jurisdiction.
85
 The trend since Datafin has been towards a contextually functional, 
not merely a functional, approach. Venning J was thus justified in considering NIWA’s 
public attributes and concluding that its decisions were within jurisdiction. However, this 
does not mean that the contrary arguments explored above should be disregarded. Instead, 
these lend support to the arguments for non- or partial justiciability traversed in Part IV, 
and ultimately to my conclusion that review should be limited to cases of flagrant 
impropriety. 
                                                   
79 Mercury Energy, above n 5 and Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 
385. For discussion, see Cassie and Knight, above n 36, at 66. 
80 Datafin, above n 39, at 574. 
81 Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, above n 40, at 11. 
82 Cane, above n 38, at 271-272. 
83 See for example, Agrotain International LLC v Fertiliser Quality Council Inc HC Wellington CIV 2009-
485-1855, 17 December 2009. 
84 Cane, above n 38, at 17. Cassie and Knight, above n 36, at 65-66. 
85 R v Somerset County Council ex p Dixon [1997] COD 323. 
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IV Judging justiciability: why NIWA’s decisions should be declared non- 
or partially justiciable. 
The “[un]suitability of the Court’s personnel and processes” to resolving a particular 
dispute is key to determining justiciability.86 However, justiciability, unlike jurisdiction, is 
part of a spectrum of responses the Court might employ, from non-justiciability (not 
examining the issue at all) to partial or secondary justiciability (which involves deference 
to the decision-maker) through the ordinary standard for review and on to hard-look 
review (where the Court more intensively scrutinises decisions). In this part, I traverse the 
arguments for review of scientific research falling on the non- and partial justiciability side 
of the spectrum. Issues highlighted include problems with the adversarial system, 
particularly in relation to polycentric decisions. Judges lacking scientific knowledge may 
struggle with decisions regarding research whilst expert witnesses may not represent 
mainstream scientific views. Furthermore, plaintiffs are unlikely to be disadvantaged if 
deprived of the full suite of judicial review grounds by either non- or partial justiciability, 
as many are problematic in their application to scientific research. 
A The adversarial system 
The adversarial system sees advocates relentlessly supporting their party to ensure that 
both sides’ best arguments are considered. This contrasts strongly with the scientific 
approach of posing a hypothesis to see if the academic community can disprove it.87 Both 
methods have adapted to meet different objectives. Whilst science is the dispassionate 
search for truth, the law also seeks fairness.88  
A clear example of the conflict between scientific and adversarial methods, although not 
court-based, is the climate change debate. The scientific community has long agreed that 
anthropogenic climate change is occurring, having rigorously tested this hypothesis. The 
only disagreements concern the precise magnitude of change, whether ‘tipping points’ 
exist and the sensitivity of the Earth system to changes in greenhouse gas concentrations.89 
                                                   
86 Harris, above n 35, at 640. 
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By contrast, the public have witnessed a war of attrition between ardent believers and 
disbelievers in climate change. In adversarial fashion, both sides cling to their convictions, 
raising any and all evidence, however dubious.90 This macro-scale example exposes the 
dangers of trying to resolve scientific issues using adversarial methods. 
The adversarial system is also criticised for failing to adequately address polycentric 
decisions, those containing many intermingling and interacting factors which vary over 
time.
91
 These are not easily resolved into a two-sided issue as the Court process 
demands.92 Thus, it is doubtful whether polycentric decisions belong in court at all. Some 
authors counter that courts decide complex matters frequently. However, just because a 
question is complex does not mean it is polycentric. For example, considerable highly 
technical information might be needed to establish that a scientist acted fraudulently when 
conducting research; however, this remains a two-sided issue. By contrast, selecting a 
methodology requires consideration not only of existing scientific opinion, but also data 
that may contain subsets which would work better with different methodologies. Other 
factors such as required corrections and margins of error are then affected by methodology 
decisions and, in turn, impact the strength of final conclusions. Thus, such decisions are 
comparable to a spider’s web, with multiple nodes affected if one strand is moved.93 
B Inexpert judges 
Furthermore, studies from the United States in light of Daubert v Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals Inc suggest that judges, a key component of the adversarial system, have 
difficulty understanding scientific matters. There is as yet no evidence to suggest a 
different result would be obtained in New Zealand. 
In Daubert, the US Supreme Court gave itself responsibility for judging the credibility of 
scientific studies.
94
 Judges were charged with eliminating ‘junk science’ from the 
courtroom to prevent it from influencing juries. Rather than relying on experts with 
impressive credentials, judges must examine criteria such as falsifiability, peer review, 
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error rates and whether the particular evidence is generally accepted by the scientific 
community.95 However, commentators have argued that judicial understanding of science 
is insufficient to perform this function, despite efforts to better train judges in dealing with 
scientific information through conferences and courses.
96
 Others have questioned whether 
it is fair to force judges to make decisions they are not trained for, with some finding the 
experience “uncomfortable and daunting”.97 
Education within an adversarial system may cause judges to understand crucial concepts, 
such as uncertainty, very differently from scientists. The scientific method demands 
careful collection of data and integral to this process is recognising and accounting for 
uncertainty, with results always accompanied by confidence intervals. Judges by contrast 
seek “clear decisions [from] uncertain principles” so often favour ‘bright-line’ approaches, 
creating a threshold that evidence must meet to sustain a case.98 An example is the US 
approach to epidemiological evidence involving the increased risk of a particular condition 
developing in individuals exposed to certain factors. Multiple courts held that to find 
causation between the factor and condition, the risk to an average person must have 
doubled.99 This leaves particularly susceptible plaintiffs unprotected.100 Whilst not a 
judicial review case, this example shows that even senior judges may inappropriately fuse 
legal and scientific concepts. 
Essentially, a language barrier exists between judges and scientists, which is unsurprising 
given that 96 per cent of 400 judges surveyed in the US lacked general scientific 
training.
101
 Only four per cent properly understood error rates, whilst only six per cent 
understood falsifiability, worrying statistics given that these are fundamental scientific 
concepts.102 Judges also failed to accurately interpret statistical information, a problem also 
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experienced in the New Zealand courts.
103
 Indeed, one argument raised in support of 
judicial review is that judges’ written reasoning shows scientists how generalists perceive 
their evidence, as well as communicating it to the public.104 However, such an opinion 
could be obtained more cheaply and quickly through means other than litigation. 
Undoubtedly, judges regularly consider complex scientific matters, such as those regarding 
forensic evidence in criminal trials.105 However, this does not justify ignoring the poor 
scientific literacy illustrated above. It is perhaps better to question whether currently 
judges are sufficiently equipped to determine the reliability of forensic evidence. Indeed, 
some surveys suggest that judicial understanding of concepts key to evaluating the 
usefulness of forensic analyses is also worryingly poor.
106
 
It has been suggested that judges educate themselves before particular cases. Whilst this 
may undermine the adversarial system by encouraging judges to be more inquisitorial, 
whether this is considered positive or negative may depend on perspective.107 Of 136 US 
judges surveyed, 21 per cent reportedly thought it very desirable to read additional peer-
reviewed articles, whilst 25 per cent considered it very undesirable. Such supplementary 
study is already banned in several US states, illustrating the tension over the 
appropriateness of judicial research into anything besides the law.108 Other problems 
include time constraints given judges’ caseload, and ensuring the resources considered are 
of good quality.109 Further, inconsistencies may arise if some judges undertake additional 
research and others do not.110 
Alternatively, specialist courts might be created to decide cases with high science 
contents.111 Such courts already exist for family, employment and environmental cases, 
with points of law appealable to the High Court and Court of Appeal. Specialist judges 
might better distinguish issues they may determine from scientific matters to be avoided.
112
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However, cost is likely to be prohibitive, especially as difficult cases are infrequent. 
Furthermore, a Court whose primary purpose is to decide what it should not itself decide 
seems wasteful of resources. Thus, issues of judges’ lack of scientific expertise must be 
addressed through other means, such as justiciability. 
C Expert witnesses 
Expert witnesses should help remedy the deficiencies in judges’ scientific knowledge. 
Expert witnesses are those with “specialised knowledge or skill based on training, study or 
experience”.113 Their role is to assist the Court in understanding evidence or reach a 
decision of fact.114 However, it is questionable whether they are effective, given that a 
survey of lawyers found that many do not understand their own expert’s testimony.
115
 It is 
unlikely judges fare any better, particularly as judicial review cases generally involve only 
written testimony.116 
Such experts’ overriding duty is to impartially assist the Court; however, their testimony 
may exhibit unconscious and selection biases.117 Unconscious bias refers to expert 
witnesses inadvertently aligning themselves with their client, in reaction to the adversarial 
system’s competitive nature.118 Indeed, judges have criticised expert witnesses for 
precisely this.119 Selection bias is also problematic, as counsel hire experts not 
representative of mainstream scientific opinion, purely because they support their client’s 
case.120 Thus, scientists with unconventional views are perceived to garner unjustified 
prominence in the courtroom.121 This may give decision-makers the impression that the 
debate amongst experts is heated when in fact one side has overwhelming support.
122
 
Such bias might be overcome by utilising independent experts. Judges sitting alone might 
increasingly use their discretion to appoint independent experts to inquire into questions of 
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fact or opinion outside of the judge’s expertise.
123
 Alternatively, the ability to appoint lay 
members to assist in understanding expert evidence could be extended to trials involving 
high scientific content. Lay members are currently permitted only in certain commercial, 
human rights and property matters.
124
 
Even a court-appointed expert’s opinion may not reflect the mainstream scientific 
position.125 A panel of experts would give a more nuanced view of any debate, although 
the generalist judge must make the final decision. Furthermore, judges supported by a 
panel of experts may feel confident ruling on increasingly scientific matters rather than 
restricting themselves to law and facts. There would also be practical constraints such as 
timing and cost when endeavouring to appoint such a panel and little research exists on the 
effectiveness of independent experts. 
D The grounds of judicial review 
Furthermore, even if scientific research were declared non- or partially justiciable, 
plaintiffs will suffer little hardship as cases like NIWA’s fit poorly into the grounds of 
judicial review. The Court is not restricted to examining the three traditional grounds of 
illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality.126 However, many sub-grounds will be 
satisfied in such limited circumstances as to be virtually useless to plaintiffs. Scientific 
research seems very unlikely to encounter errors of law, for example. Others, such as error 
of fact, relevancy, bias and irrationality may be problematic in their application. 
A claim of procedural impropriety, for example, appears unlikely to succeed in cases like 
NIWA’s. Many organisations making decisions based on scientific information have 
consultation processes dictated by statute and it is entirely proper that the Court should 
enforce these.127 However, CRIs have no mandated procedure and it is argued that the 
nature of the power exercised and surrounding circumstances do not justify implying a 
duty to consult.128 It is unrealistic to expect NIWA to take submissions on how research 
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should be performed.
129
 Consulting non-experts would yield little benefit and expert 
opinion should be canvassed through a thorough literature review. Furthermore, Venning J 
reasons that the public may be affected by resulting government policies. To consult the 
public would not be feasible and would mean material would effectively be published 
before the official decision to publish was made. The scientific method also already 
provides for criticism of NIWA’s approach. 130 Wider consultation should only occur at 
the point that policy based on the research is formulated. 
Error of fact claims are also problematic as they require serious errors regarding an 
incontrovertible fact which is central to the decision.131 Few incontrovertible facts exist in 
science, with uncertainty attached to virtually every result. Also, as NIWA’s case 
demonstrates, it is practically impossible to demonstrate that it is an incontrovertible fact 
that a particular methodology should be used. Thus, even if available, the error of fact 
ground would rarely assist plaintiffs. 
Venning J appeared to consider the “current state of knowledge” and “currently recognised 
scientific opinion” mandatory relevant considerations.
132
 However, given that in many 
fields there is much debate as to what the current state of science is, it would be 
inappropriate for generalist judges to determine what this entails. 
Strong arguments exist that claiming the decision-maker was biased would rarely assist 
plaintiffs. The test for bias amongst judges is whether a “fair-minded lay observer would 
reasonably apprehend that the [decision-maker] might not bring an impartial mind” to the 
issue.
133
 Being in debt to or related to one of the parties is thus sufficient.
134
 However, 
research often relies on funding from organisations with vested interests. Furthermore, the 
process of formulating hypotheses arguably biases researchers towards a particular result. 
However, the scientific method is designed to assist the objective search for truth, 
regardless of researchers’ backgrounds. Indeed, there are precautions in place to prevent 
scientists’ expectations from influencing results, such as undertaking a double-blind trial, 
where neither the subject nor the investigator knows who is in the test and control groups. 
Additionally, many journals require authors to declare conflicting interests in their 
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articles.
135
 A reasonable lay observer should understand this. Thus, scientists are only 
likely to be successfully accused of bias in the presence of corruption or fraud, which I 
argue below, is the only time that judicial review is justifiable. 
Irrationality is also unlikely to yield results. No mitigating factors, as described in Wolf v 
Minister of Immigration, apply so the threshold to demonstrate unreasonableness would be 
high.136  The Wednesbury test which requires a decision “so outrageous in its defiance of 
logic…that no sensible person…could have arrived at it” is falling from favour, but judges 
remain anxious not to usurp the decision-maker’s role as finder of fact.137 Such high 
thresholds will never be satisfied when there is any scientific dispute on the matter, as 
there was in NIWA’s case. Furthermore, to understand the differences between scientific 
methodologies often requires considerable training so the majority of “sensible” people 
could not be expected to distinguish between them. 
The innominate or Guinness ground is perhaps the most far-reaching in judicial review, 
leaving much to the Court’s discretion. It only requires that something has “gone wrong of 
a nature and degree which [requires] the intervention of the Court”.
138
 Some judges 
consider it merely a repetition of the principle that courts are not confined to existing 
grounds of review;139 others view it as a distinct ground.140 However, in cases like 
NIWA’s, the arguments made above might be rehearsed, demonstrating first that judicial 
intervention is not required, as either individuals’ rights have not been affected or 
complainants have other forms of redress.141 Secondly, this part has raised serious 
questions about whether a dispute involving scientific research is of such a nature that the 
Court should intervene, due to issues surrounding the adversarial process and judicial 
expertise. 
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E Summary 
This part has demonstrated that strong arguments exist that the Court’s personnel and 
processes are ill-equipped to resolve scientific issues. The adversarial system is unsuited to 
addressing polycentric decisions, whilst judges lack fundamental scientific knowledge and 
expert witnesses may not overcome this deficit. Even potential solutions such as 
appointing expert panels or reserving complex cases for scientifically-trained judges are 
problematic. Thus, powerful arguments exist that judicial review should be excluded 
completely through a finding of non-justiciability or a deferential standard applied (partial 
justiciability). Part V will explore why the latter is preferable. 
V Definitely deference: solutions to the problem of judicially reviewing 
scientific research. 
In this part, I examine how the problems with the adversarial system, judges’ lack of 
training and expert witnesses explored above might be minimised. While non-justiciability 
may prevent judicial interference, it bucks the current trend towards increased scrutiny of 
public decision-makers and may allow CRIs acting fraudulently to escape consequences. 
However, something more than the deferential standard Venning J applied is needed as 
NIWA’s case demonstrates that even judges endeavouring to avoid making scientific 
decisions may be unsuccessful. Furthermore, scientific advancement may slow if 
researchers must worry about judicial scrutiny. I propose an intermediate position, with 
judicial review reserved for instances of ‘flagrant impropriety’ in cases such as NIWA’s. 
A Non-justiciability 
Whilst declaring scientific research matters to be non-justiciable would certainly protect 
the research process from judicial interference, it is problematic. Such a finding would run 
counter to New Zealand’s trend towards increasingly intensive review.142 Courts are 
unwilling to leave public power unchecked, perhaps reflecting greater demand amongst 
ordinary New Zealanders for accountability in the public sector.143 Even those answerable 
to the public through elections may only escape review when addressing matters of high 
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policy or national security.
144
 CRIs would appear out-of-place on the list of decision-
makers protected by non-justiciability. 
Moreover, non-justiciability would protect any decision to publish by CRIs, even if it were 
fraudulent or corrupt. This is particularly troubling given taxpayer dollars are involved. 
Furthermore, aside from public and professional condemnation and employment 
consequences, New Zealand has no mechanism for addressing such behaviour.145 Indeed, 
only 11 countries worldwide do.
146
 Of these, the Danish Committee on Scientific 
Dishonesty is most comprehensive although limited to public health research.147 The 
committee comprises 14 members with “science expertise” but is chaired by a High Court 
judge.
148
 In addition to preventative work, it investigates falsification and distortion of 
results, plagiarism and inappropriate authorship credit.149 It is beyond the scope of this 
paper to determine the need for such a body in New Zealand. However, in its absence, 
courts should be able to sanction the worst offenders. Thus, decisions such as NIWA’s 
should not be declared non-justiciable. 
B Deference or partial justiciability 
Whereas courts “have remained alert to situations of non-justiciability,” the exercise of 
deference or its opposite, ‘hard look review’, is somewhat contentious in New Zealand.150 
Deference or partial justiciability involves reviewing less intensively, for example by 
declining to examine certain matters or requiring a higher level of proof.151 Some judges, 
including Elias CJ, strongly oppose varying the intensity of review.152 Others have 
wavered, with Hammond J applying a ‘hard look’ in New Zealand Public Service 
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Association Inc v Hamilton City Council, before declaring such spectra unfeasible.
153
 Part 
of their concern is that deference suggests judicial obsequiousness or the Court’s failure to 
properly fulfil its supervisory role.154 However, variable intensities of review have gained 
traction regarding the amelioration of Wednesbury unreasonableness.
155
 Authors and 
professionals have openly embraced the concept, with commentators concluding that 
unacknowledged deference is more widespread in New Zealand than commonly 
thought.
156
 
Most common law jurisdictions utilise some form of deference.157 However, most 
literature on deference in science-related matters is, once again, US-based. US courts are at 
their “most deferential” when examining ‘agency science’, in an approach known as 
‘super-deference’.158 However, its effectiveness is questionable as decisions of 
organisations like the Environmental Protection Agency are frequently overturned, 
although this may reflect more on its policymaking than its research.159 Furthermore, even 
with deference, judges make mistakes when contemplating complex science. In Industrial 
Union Department v American Petroleum Institute for example, what the US Supreme 
Court found to constitute a “trivial risk” has been described as so plainly wrong that it 
would have been obvious to “anyone who has had Toxicology 101, even if they got a D in 
it”.
160
 
C NIWA’s case and the dangers of deference 
NIWA’s case further illustrates the problems with deference. Despite stating that the Court 
should not determine matters of science, Venning J unintentionally decides scientific 
questions whilst unsuccessfully attempting to lower the intensity of review. He further fails 
to address issues surrounding the often-blurred boundary between science and fact, 
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enabling future counsel to engage in the “science charade”. Finally, even his deferential 
approach may lead to an ossification of research. 
First, regarding inadvertent scientific decisions, Venning J is clear that the Court will not 
intervene in scientific matters. New Zealand Pork Industry Board v The Director-General 
of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry contains a similar statement that the Court will 
not determine whether institutions “got their science right.”161 Venning J thus declares 
multiple issues to be matters of scientific debate and inappropriate for the Court to decide. 
These include whether NIWA properly accounted for sheltering of weather stations and 
whether the methodology used was open to it.162 However, in doing so, the judge is 
deciding for the scientific establishment that there remains a debate and no ‘best’ 
methodology exists for such cases.163 Here, this was probably true, with NIWA’s expert 
citing journal articles describing multiple valid methodologies.164 However, judges may 
occasionally make the wrong decision and find there is on-going scientific debate when 
almost all experts are in agreement or vice versa. 
Second, Venning J states that “less intensive review…is appropriate” but fails to 
implement a deferential standard.165 Both the judge and parties accept that NIWA must 
consider the “current state of knowledge”.166 Thus, the Court must make a scientific 
judgment as to what this represents. The judge also makes no comment as to whether 
“officially recognised scientific opinion”, the Trust’s preferred standard, actually exists. 
He instead leaves it open for later courts to apply such a standard and mistakenly influence 
science. Furthermore, in saying that the Court will be “cautious” when addressing matters 
of science, Venning J does not rule out the Court openly intervening when it believes it 
may “definitively adjudicate on scientific opinions”.167 
Additionally, as Ferrere notes, Venning J’s attempt to introduce deference is ineffective.
168
 
His requirement that the decision be “clearly wrong” before courts intervene actually 
equates to “a decision outside the permissible boundaries to the exercise of...discretion”.169 
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Since this is the normal standard applied in judicial review cases, Venning J’s formulation 
allows later courts to scrutinise scientific research as they would any other decision.170 
NIWA’s case also highlights the blurred boundary between fact and science. Venning J 
will intervene in factual arguments, although the threshold for finding mistakes of fact is 
high.171 However, he will not (purposely) interfere in scientific debates, providing an 
incentive for plaintiffs to portray issues as mistakes of fact rather than scientific 
disagreements. Furthermore, judges may not always satisfactorily distinguish between 
factual and scientific issues, particularly as science is the search for facts, leading to a 
confusing overlap. If judges cannot reliably locate the boundary, the unwary may 
inadvertently judge science or fail to judge facts. 
The Trust’s complaint that the methodology used in NIWA’s review was “flawed, 
unprecedented, outdated and unpublished” illustrates this difficulty.172 Whilst the judge 
considered this a scientific matter and thus deferred to NIWA, it might equally well be 
argued as a matter of fact as it could be determined whether a method is “unprecedented, 
outdated and unpublished” through examining scientific literature. Also treated as a 
scientific issue is the claim that NIWA did not account for non-climatic features which 
could have influenced results.173 However, NIWA could easily have demonstrated 
factually that it had identified relevant non-climatic influences and undertaken corrections 
(although the appropriateness of those corrections would be a matter of science). 
The issue of counsel taking advantage of the difficulties inherent in distinguishing science 
from reviewable matters is known in US literature as the “science charade”.
174
 As judges 
will defer to expert bodies on scientific matters, agencies creating science-based policy 
have allegedly portrayed “bad policy decisions as reasoned scientific analysis”.175 
Meanwhile, plaintiffs try to argue scientific matters as policy decisions to encourage 
review.176 Such arguments may succeed improperly where judges lack scientific 
knowledge. Parties in the US already “race to the courthouse”, hoping to be heard by 
                                                   
170 Ferrere, above n 76, at 381. 
171 See Part IVD. 
172 NIWA’s case, above n 1, at [152]. 
173 At [165]. 
174 Clark, above n 60, at 346. 
175 At 342. 
176 At 346. 
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particular judges who will be more or less willing to involve themselves in issues of 
science.177 
Furthermore, scientists may be reticent to publish knowing that judges may scrutinise their 
work, particularly if their results are controversial. The mere existence of a court case may 
impact their reputations and employment prospects, especially given the cost to employers. 
Indeed, NIWA spent over $100,000 defending itself against the Trust’s allegations, 
although it was later awarded costs.
178
 The resultant unwillingness to publish would be 
problematic as publishing and garnering critique from peers is vital to the scientific 
method. Alternatively, scientists may expend excessive time and resources gathering more 
data and conducting multiple analyses to ensure they will not be criticised by the Court. 
Plaintiffs also favour “blunderbuss attacks”, with counsel criticising as many aspects of the 
science as possible, hoping that one argument at least will be accepted.179 Such tactics 
potentially distort the focus of science by forcing scientists to consider and address any 
minor point which might be scrutinised in court.180 
D The flagrant impropriety standard 
This paper has demonstrated that denying review based on non-justiciability leaves the 
system open to abuse by scientists.181 However, Venning J’s model of deference offers the 
research process too little protection, ignoring the inadequacies of the court process in 
relation to scientific matters. The solution therefore appears to lie between the two, with 
what Knight calls “flagrant impropriety”.182 This standard is typified by the Privy 
Council’s determination in Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd.183 Instead of plaintiffs having access to all the grounds of review, the Court would 
only intercede in SOEs’ commercial activities in cases of “fraud, corruption or bad 
faith.”
184
 
                                                   
177 Thomas O McGarity “Judicial Review of Scientific Rulemaking” (1984) 9 Science, Technology & 
Human Values 97 at 103. 
178 Trevor Quinn “Climate sceptics fail in NIWA case” Dominion Post (online ed, Wellington, 7 September 
2012).  
179 Hammond Meazell “Super Deference”, above n 61, at 750; Thomas O McGarity “Daubert and the Proper 
Role for the Courts in Health, Safety and Environmental Regulation” (2005) 95 Am J Public Health 92 at 
S96. 
180McGarity “Daubert”, above n 179, at S97. 
181 See Part IVD. 
182 Knight “Murky Methodology”, above n 150, at 136. 
183 Mercury Energy, above n 5. 
184 At 391. 
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Venning J expressly rejected this standard in NIWA’s case, reasoning that plaintiffs may 
challenge SOEs’ decisions in private law but have no such recourse with CRIs. However, 
as demonstrated in Part III, other options are available and since individuals’ rights will 
only be impacted when a resulting policy decision is implemented, only at this later stage 
should intensive judicial review be conducted. It is arguable that Mercury Energy may be 
distinguished as SOEs operate in the private commercial sphere, whilst NIWA is entirely 
public-focused. However, SOEs make decisions which would otherwise be private, but 
because they are themselves public entities, these decisions are within the Court’s 
jurisdiction. NIWA is the same; as demonstrated earlier, its decisions had no “real 
practical” public consequences.
185
 Only NIWA’s position as a public body justified a 
finding of ‘publicness’. Furthermore, universities conducting similar work might be 
assisted by “the freedom...to engage in research” enshrined in the Education Act 1989, as 
publishing is integral to the research process.186 New Zealand has witnessed a trend 
towards decreasing judicial intervention in the market, with judges viewing commerce as 
sacrosanct.
187
 This does not mean that commercial decisions alone should be afforded 
protection. Science also makes invaluable contributions to society. 
Restricting review to cases of flagrant impropriety surmounts the arguments raised in the 
three parts above. It acknowledges the improbability of individuals being harmed by 
decisions such as NIWA’s. However, it provides a legal remedy should scientists behave 
improperly. It also recognises the risk that judges might inadvertently make decisions of 
science, which would be particularly harmful given the unsuitability of the adversarial 
system and indeed, judges themselves to determining such issues. Instead, it places the 
Court squarely within its usual range of operations, examining the facts to determine 
whether fraud has occurred. In doing so, it reassures the public that CRIs acting 
inappropriately will be held accountable. 
E Summary 
Having examined the arguments for both non- and partial justiciability, I conclude that 
“fraud, corruption or bad faith” is the optimal standard of deference when reviewing 
decisions such as NIWA’s. A finding of non-justiciability would give scientists a freedom 
                                                   
185 See Part III; Peters v Davison, above n 42, at 188. 
186 Education Act 1989 s 161(2)(b). 
187 See Palmer and Wevers, above n 155.  
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to act improperly that is almost unparalleled in the public sphere. However, Venning J’s 
standard of deference allows judges to unintentionally determine scientific issues. In 
attempting to lower the intensity of review, he in fact allowed later courts to be anything 
but deferential. His decision also ignored the significant problem of the blurred boundary 
between fact and science which may allow unwary judges to decide matters of science. 
Scientific advancement might be delayed as scientists endeavour to ensure their decisions 
are above reproach, or forego publishing entirely. Thus, review should be restricted to 
cases of flagrant impropriety. 
VI Conclusion 
This paper proposed an alternative standard of judicial review in cases of scientific 
research to that adopted by Venning J in NIWA’s case. Whilst the judge was right to find 
NIWA’s decisions to be within the Court’s jurisdiction, its decision to publish did not 
directly impact individuals’ rights. A finding that research could impact reputations 
presumes that the public would be willing to accept the findings of a single piece of 
research, despite knowing that science is not infallible. The absence of judicial review 
would also not leave plaintiffs without redress as they may seek review of any policy 
decision based upon the scientific research. This already occurs in the European 
Community Courts. Furthermore, if plaintiffs have a valid scientific point, they could ask a 
reputable scientist to write a paper and have it published in a credible journal, and if the 
scientific community agrees, the initial conclusion would be discredited. However, 
Venning J was still justified in determining that NIWA’s decisions were within the Court’s 
public law jurisdiction as courts do not apply a purely functional approach. Thus, NIWA’s 
nature as a public institution meant that its decisions may be considered public. 
However, the adversarial system may not appropriately address scientific issues given its 
incompatibility with the scientific method. Expert witnesses appearing in court tend to be 
those outside the mainstream of scientific opinion, selected primarily for their ability to 
support the client’s arguments. Moreover, judges lack the expertise to become involved in 
scientific decisions, with US studies revealing very low scientific proficiency in their 
judiciary. 
If these problems were remedied by finding NIWA’s decisions to be non-justiciable, 
scientists might escape scrutiny when acting fraudulently or in bad faith. Thus, partial 
30                            Can’t See the Science for the Solicitors: Judicial Review of Scientific Research in Light of NIWA’s case 
justiciability, or deference, is preferable; however, Venning J’s formulation enables 
inexpert judges to determine matters of science. The judge himself inadvertently draws 
conclusions as to science, and his attempt at deference is unsuccessful as the standard he 
sets is no different from usual. Furthermore, scientific judgments are necessary to 
determine whether the required “current state of knowledge” has been considered. There is 
also a risk that counsel may encourage the confusion of fact and science, as Venning J is 
prepared to review matters of fact but will not intervene in scientific disputes. In addition, 
should scientists become concerned that judges lacking scientific expertise will criticise 
their work, they may spend excessive time and resources ensuring their research is above 
reproach. These issues will not be resolved by a low standard of deference. Instead, 
decisions regarding CRIs’ research should be reviewed only in cases of flagrant 
impropriety or “fraud, corruption or bad faith”. This standard protects the research process 
from non-scientist judges but allows courts to intervene when scientists have acted 
reprehensibly. 
Thus, NIWA’s decisions should not have been judicially reviewed as they were. Whilst 
they fall under the Court’s public law jurisdiction, the nature of the Court’s processes 
makes it unsuited to determining such issues, requiring an extremely high level of 
deference. Instead, the Trust should have utilised non-legal methods or waited and sought 
judicial review of a resulting policy decision. As to whether these findings might be 
applied to other cases involving complex scientific evidence, we must conclude, like every 
good science paper, that more research is needed. 
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